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IF I GO CRAZY, THEN WILL YOU STILL CALL ME A SUPER 
PAC? HOW ENMESHMENT WITH POLITICAL ACTION 
COMMITTEES MAKES CONTRIBUTION LIMITS ENFORCEABLE 
ON INDEPENDENT EXPENDITURE-ONLY COMMITTEES 
Brian Greivenkamp* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Campaign finance is a confusing and often intimidating area of the 
law.  Even attempting to discuss the subject with the uninitiated requires 
a fair deal of knowledge of complicated acronyms and technical terms 
of art.  Despite the difficulty of discussing campaign finance without 
this background, the subject’s importance is becoming increasingly 
evident.  In the 2012 presidential election, the playing field faced 
radically different parameters than those faced a mere four years before.  
As the 2016 election begins to loom large on the horizon, it is important 
for those participating in political elections, as well as socially-
conscious citizens, to understand how political campaigns are financed 
and what restrictions campaigns face.    
The difference between political action committees (PACs) and 
independent expenditure-only committees (commonly known as Super 
PACs) is one of the most confusing aspects of campaign finance law.  A 
PAC is generally an organization that coordinates with a candidate 
regarding his or her election, possibly in conjunction with a specific 
political issue.  These committees are highly regulated in terms of what 
they may accept as contributions and what sort of expenditures they may 
make on behalf of candidates.1  Super PACs, in contrast, are generally 
neither limited by what contributions they may accept, nor what 
expenditures they may make.2  One of the major distinctions that 
differentiate a Super PAC from an ordinary PAC is that a Super PAC 
may neither coordinate with a candidate nor make contributions directly 
to a candidate’s campaign.3  Therefore, the general function of a Super 
PAC is to purchase advertisements which promote a candidate, attack an 
opposing candidate, or address the validity of a candidate’s messages.   
Most candidates in a major election have a Super PAC that is closely 
associated with the candidate’s campaign.4  As long as the Super PAC 
 
            *    Associate Member, 2014–2015 University of Cincinnati Law Review. 
 1. 2 U.S.C.A§ 431 (1971) (current version at 52 U.S.C.A. § 30101 (2014)). 
 2. See generally Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
 3. Id. at 47. 
 4. See Garrick B. Pursley, The Campaign Finance Safeguards of Federalism, 63 EMORY L.J. 
781, 786 (2014). 
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does not coordinate with the candidate or an agent of the candidate, this 
relationship is legal.5  Occasionally, however, Super PACs develop as a 
branch of an already existing PAC, ostensibly for the purpose of 
working toward a mutual goal.6  These related organizations have been 
known to share directors, bank accounts, and fundraising ventures.7  
Recent jurisprudence on the issue has posited that this closely enmeshed 
relationship is also legal.8  In the summer of 2014, a decision by the 
United States Court of Appeals in the Second Circuit, Vermont Right to 
Life Committee, Inc. v. Sorrell, created a circuit split on this issue, 
holding that contribution limits to PACs also apply to Super PACs if the 
latter is functionally indistinguishable from the former.9 
This Casenote examines whether the Second Circuit’s holding in 
Vermont Right to Life Committee, Inc. v. Sorrell was correct, and 
whether other circuits should adopt its holding.  Part II discusses the 
background surrounding the jurisprudence of contribution limits 
imposed on Super PACs.  Part III discusses Vermont Right to Life 
Committee, Inc. v. Sorrell, and why the Second Circuit decided to break 
away from persuasive authority on the issue of contribution limits.  Part 
IV examines the major arguments in favor of the Second Circuit’s 
opinion.  In Part V, this Casenote outlines potential drawbacks to the 
Second Circuit’s findings and analyzes whether or not considerations 
made by other circuits may outweigh the Second Circuit’s rationale.  
Finally, this Casenote will conclude by stating that the Second Circuit’s 
holding is the correct one and should be adopted by other circuits in the 
future. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The Federal Election Campaign Act 
The 1971 Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) imposed the first 
regulations on PACs.10  FECA established the principle that persons, 
whether they are individuals or corporations, can contribute only a 
certain predetermined amount to a political action committee over the 
course of a calendar year.11  This same statute sets out important 
 
 5. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47; Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 314 
(2010). 
 6. See Vermont Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Sorrell, 758 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 7. Id. 
 8. See N. Carolina Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake, 525 F.3d 274 (4th Cir. 2008). 
 9. Sorrell, 758 F.3d at 141. 
 10. 2 U.S.C.A. § 431 (1971) (current version at 52 U.S.C.A. § 30101 (2014)). 
 11. Id. Part 11 of this statute clarifies that “person” refers to committees and corporations as well 
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definitions for the terms “contribution,” “expenditure,” and 
“independent expenditure”.  The statute defines a contribution as, “any 
gift, subscription, loan, advance, or deposit of money or anything of 
value made by any person for the purpose of influencing any election for 
Federal office.”12  For the purposes of this Casenote, the term 
“contribution” refers to a gift of money either by an individual or 
corporation to a PAC committee. 
FECA defines an “expenditure” as “any purchase, payment, 
distribution, loan, advance, deposit, or gift of money or anything of 
value, made by any person for the purpose of influencing any election 
for Federal office; and a written contract, promise, or agreement to make 
an expenditure.”13  These sorts of expenditures can be anything given 
out by a political committee, including direct financial gifts to 
campaigns.  An “independent expenditure,” on the other hand, is defined 
as an expenditure “expressly advocating the election or defeat of a 
clearly identified candidate; and that is not made in concert or 
cooperation with or at the request or suggestion of such candidate, the 
candidate's authorized political committee, or their agents, or a political 
party committee or its agents.”14  Independent expenditures are almost 
always advertisements or pamphlets produced by a political committee.    
B. United States Supreme Court Cases 
The Supreme Court’s Super PAC jurisprudence dates back to 1976.  
In Buckley v. Valeo, the United States Supreme Court invalidated a 
ceiling on independent expenditures, stating that the absence of 
coordination with the candidate “alleviates the danger that expenditures 
will be given as a quid pro quo for improper commitments from the 
candidate.”15  California Medical Association v. FEC (Cal-Med) also 
emphasized that same point.16  In Cal-Med, Justice Blackmun, 
concurring with the plurality’s opinion, in part, and concurring in the 
judgment, articulated that political corruption is the only constitutional 
motivation for limiting political contributions and that the limitations 
must be “no broader than necessary to achieve that interest.”17  
As recently as April of 2014, the United States Supreme Court has 
continued to hold that the motivation to reduce quid pro quo 
 
as individuals. 
 12. Id. at  30101(8)(A)(i). 
 13. Id. at 30101(9)(A)(i–ii). 
 14. Id. at 30101(17)(A–B). 
 15. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 47 (1976). 
 16. California Med. Ass'n v. Fed. Elec. Comm’n, 453 U.S. 182 (1981). 
 17. Id. at 203 (opinion of Blackmun, J.). 
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arrangements, or the appearance of such arrangements, is the only 
constitutionally permissible motivation by which the federal government 
may restrict campaign contributions.18  However, no United States 
Supreme Court case has held that the possibility of quid pro quo 
arrangements is sufficient rationale to limit the amount that an 
individual or a corporation may contribute to a Super PAC.19  
In Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, the Supreme 
Court reasoned that the fact that an individual or organization has 
“influence over or access to” a candidate does not mean that the 
candidate is presumed corrupt.20  Furthermore, the Court stated that any 
possibility of corruption is outweighed by the chilling effect a 
contribution limit would impose on the free speech of the contributor.21  
In a subsequent case, The United States Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia Circuit summarized Citizens United by stating that, since 
expenditures by independent expenditure-only groups do not create the 
appearance of corruption, “there is no corrupting ‘quid’ for which a 
candidate might in exchange offer a corrupt ‘quo.’”22  Therefore, 
because there is no reason to believe that such expenditures would 
create even the appearance of corruption, it is not constitutionally 
permissible to limit contributions to groups that only make independent 
expenditures.23 
Many of these Supreme Court cases discuss the balancing act that 
campaign finance regulations must maintain between limiting the 
presence or appearance of corruption and the First Amendment rights of 
committees.  In one such case, Buckley v. Valeo, the Court regarded 
campaign contributions as political expression, a type of speech which is 
“integral to the operation of the system of government established by 
our Constitution.”24  As such, it deemed that any regulations over the 
subject “operate in an area of the most fundamental First Amendment 
activities.”25  As a general rule, courts have erred on the side of 
protecting First Amendment rights, stating that the chilling effect 
produced by regulations outweighs the interest in preventing 
corruption.26  The interest in preventing corruption is especially small if 
the regulations are imposed on a committee that makes independent 
 
 18. McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1441 (2014).  
 19. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47; Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 357 (2010). 
 20. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 314.  
 21. Id. at 357. 
 22. SpeechNow.org v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 599 F.3d 686, 694–95 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 23. Id. at 695. 
 24. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 357. 
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expenditures which, by definition, cannot be coordinated with a 
candidate.27  As such, the Supreme Court has held that independent 
expenditures do not give rise to the existence or the appearance of 
corruption, even if the independent expenditures are made by a for-
profit corporation.28 
C. The Fourth Circuit: North Carolina Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake 
In 2008, North Carolina Right to Life, Inc.  (NCRL) challenged the 
constitutionality of certain aspects of North Carolina campaign finance 
law in North Carolina Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake.29  NCRL was formed 
in 1973 for the purposes of educating the public about abortion, 
euthanasia, and protecting the sanctity of human life.30  NCRL has two 
affiliate organizations, each of which were also plaintiffs in this case.  
The first of these affiliates was the North Carolina Right to Life Political 
Action Committee (NCRL-PAC).  The second affiliate was the North 
Carolina Right to Life Committee Fund for Independent Political 
Expenditures (NCRL-FIPE).  While these organizations were admittedly 
affiliated with NCRL, they were each their own distinct legal entities, 
set up to function as a PAC and a Super PAC, respectively.31  
This case came to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit on appeal from a string of earlier decisions.  Among other 
claims, the plaintiffs challenged attempts by the state of North Carolina 
to enforce a provision of North Carolina’s General Statute §163-278 
against NCRL-FIPE.32  The statute in question establishes the limits on 
contributions made by, or accepted by, political committees.33  The 
plaintiffs claimed that NCRL-FIPE was an independent expenditure-
only committee and was, therefore, exempt from the statute’s 
limitations.34  
The state of North Carolina challenged the district court’s decision 
that enforcing contribution limits against NCRL-FIPE was 
 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29.  N. Carolina Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake, 525 F.3d 274, 277 (4th Cir. 2008). 
 30. About Us, N. CAROLINA RIGHT TO LIFE, INC., http://ncrtl.org/the-organization/ (last visited, 
Sep. 25, 2014). 
 31. Leake, 525 F.3d at 278. 
 32. Id. at 278–79 (referencing N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 163–278.13 (West).). Plaintiffs’ other 
claims were that North Carolina was unconstitutionally regulating issue advocacy by attempting to 
determine whether communications supported or opposed a particular candidate and that North Carolina 
was attempting to enforce an unconstitutional definition of “political committee” by threatening to 
impose certain obligations on groups which were not focused on nominating or electing political 
candidates. 
 33. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 163-278.13 (West). 
 34. Leake 525 F.3d at 279. 
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unconstitutional.35  The state asserted that NCRL-FIPE had an 
“interwoven relationship” with NCRL and NCRL-PAC, and that it 
defied common sense to believe that expenditures made by NCRL-FIPE 
would be independent of contributions made by the other two groups.36  
As a result, the state claimed that it was necessary to enforce 
contribution limits against NCRL-FIPE to avoid circumvention of those 
contribution limits by NCRL and NCRL-PAC, and to prevent corruption 
or the appearance of corruption.37 
In its decision, the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that the Supreme 
Court had never held that contribution limits could apply to an 
independent expenditure-only committee.38  The court went on to say 
that, although NCRL-FIPE shared staff and facilities with the other 
plaintiffs in this suit, NCRL-FIPE’s independence from these other 
groups, as a matter of law, was sufficient to qualify it for the privileges 
afforded to independent expenditure-only committees.39  The Court 
contended that, absent evidence of abuse of its legal status, the Court 
had no intention of piercing NCRL-FIPE’s corporate veil.40  Since there 
was no such evidence, the Court declined to impose any contribution 
limitations on NCRL-FIPE but maintained that it would approve of such 
limitations if it were proven that an organization was abusing its 
corporate form.41 
In a lengthy dissent, Judge Michael disagreed with the idea that the 
groups should be allowed to enjoy their legal distinctness until evidence 
of corruption arose.  He pointed out that NCRL-FIPE shared some of its 
most important resources with its sister groups, including facilities, 
directors, and staff.42  The groups were so interrelated, he observed, that 
their executive meetings and board meetings addressed the needs of all 
three groups, simultaneously.43  He reasoned that it would be difficult to 
imagine that an executive could coordinate with a candidate in her role 
as a PAC board member and then operate in her role as a Super PAC 
board member without that coordination somehow leaking through.44  
The court’s holding, he stated, gave organizations an “explicit green 
 
 35. Id. at 280 (referencing N. Carolina Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake, 482 F. Supp. 2d 686, 692 
(E.D.N.C. 2007) aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 525 F.3d 274 (4th Cir. 2008)).  
 36. Defendants-Appellees Opening and Answering Brief, at 52, North Carolina Right to Life v. 
Leake, 525 F.3d 274 (4th Cir. 2008) (No. 07-1438) 2007 WL 2406591 (C.A.4). 
 37. Leake, 525 F.3d at 280. 
 38. Id. at 292 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 47 (1976)). 
 39. Id. at 294 n.8.  
 40. Id. at 306 
 41. Id. at 306. 
 42. Id. at 336 (dissenting opinion).  
 43. Id.  
 44. Id. 
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light” to exploit a “legal loophole.”45  The entire process, therefore, 
undermined the idea that campaign finance laws should prevent the 
“appearance and reality of corruption.”46 
D. The D.C. Circuit: Emily’s List and Stop this Insanity 
1. Emily’s List v. Federal Election Commission 
In a 2009 case, Emily’s List v. Federal Election Commission, the D.C. 
Circuit Court of Appeals determined whether an organization is able to 
make both direct, coordinated expenditures and also independent 
expenditures, thus fulfilling the roles of both a PAC and a Super PAC 
without creating two distinct legal entities.47  Emily’s List is a 
progressive organization that attempts to help women get elected to 
public office if it believes the individual “can make significant 
contributions to education, health care, voting rights, and economic 
equality.”48  Emily’s List considers itself a “hybrid non-profit.”49  As 
such, Emily’s List would make both direct contributions to candidates, 
as well as expenditures “for advertisements, get-out-the-vote efforts, and 
voter registration drives.”50  On the one hand, it could only accept 
limited contributions to fund its activities as a PAC.51  On the other 
hand, it would not limit contributions made by parties for the purpose of 
funding its activities as a Super PAC.52 
The D.C. Circuit ruled that an entity which makes expenditures as a 
PAC does not forfeit its rights to make separate expenditures as a Super 
PAC.53  The court cited First Amendment concerns, noting that the First 
Amendment rights of Emily’s List were not lost when it made a direct 
coordinated expenditure to a candidate’s campaign.54  Rather, the court 
stated that Emily’s List, and organizations like it, may be required to set 
up separate bank accounts for their activities as PACs and their activities 
as Super PACs.55  The court’s reasoning was that separate bank accounts 
would make it easier for Emily’s List to keep funding for its dual 
 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 337. 
 47. Emily's List v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 581 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
 48. What We Do, EMILY’S LIST, http://www.emilyslist.org/pages/entry/what-we-do (last visited, 
Oct. 13, 2014). 
 49. Emily’s List, 581 F.3d at 12. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id.  
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
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purposes separate, thus ensuring that donor contributions would be 
subject to the appropriate contribution limits.56  However, the court also 
stated that any laws requiring hybrid groups to direct contributions to 
separate bank accounts must be tailored to ensure that the hybrid group 
is not disadvantaged as compared to a pure expenditures-only non-
profit.57  The court noted that the desire to create a bright-line rule 
would not justify an infringement of the group’s First Amendment 
rights.58 
2. Stop This Insanity, Inc. Employee Leadership Fund v. Federal 
Election Commission 
Despite the holding in Emily’s List, the question of whether separate 
bank accounts sufficiently separate indistinguishable groups has not 
been resolved in the D.C. Circuit.  In a 2012 case, Stop This Insanity, 
Inc. Employee Leadership Fund v. Federal Election Commission, a 
District of Columbia district court disagreed with the holding in Emily’s 
List.59  Stop This Insanity, Inc. (Stop This Insanity) is a corporation 
created by the “Tea Party” for the purpose of taking power away from 
elected officials and returning it to the people.60  Stop This Insanity 
attempted to set up a “connected” political action committee called Stop 
This Insanity, Inc. Employee Leadership Fund (the Leadership Fund), 
which would function as a hybrid political action committee and 
independent expenditure committee, much like the committee discussed 
in Emily’s List.61  Stop This Insanity wanted their group to be treated 
like the hybrid group in Emily’s List so that it could be exempt from 
contribution limitations when acting as a Super PAC.  To this effect, the 
Leadership Fund sought declaratory and injunctive relief that would 
allow it to accept unlimited contributions in their capacity as an 
independent expenditures-only committee.62 
In order to prepare the Leadership Fund for its utilization as a Super 
PAC, Stop This Insanity wanted to set up separate bank accounts in the 
belief that it was following the guidelines set out by the D.C. Circuit 
Court of Appeals.63 Stop This Insanity contended that Emily’s List was 
 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 17. 
 58. Id. (citing Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wisconsin Right To Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007)). 
 59. Stop This Insanity, Inc. Employee Leadership Fund v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 902 F. Supp. 
2d 23 (D.D.C. 2012), aff’d, 761 F.3d 10 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 60. About TheTeaParty.net, THETEAPARTY.NET, http://www.theteaparty.net/about-the-tea-party/ 
(last visited, Oct. 13, 2014). 
 61. Stop This Insanity, 902 F. Supp. 2d at 26. 
 62. Id. at 26–27. 
 63. Id. at 28. 
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controlling precedent in the case at hand, at least insofar as it applied to 
contribution limits.64 
The district court declined to adopt any of the holdings of Emily’s List 
as they applied to contribution limits, referring to the D.C. Circuit’s 
discussion of the topic as “pure dicta.”65  The court also found this case 
to be distinguishable from Emily’s List, because the hybrid group in 
Emily’s List never attempted to take any actions that amounted to 
express advocacy of an individual federal candidate.66  The court 
expressed concerns regarding the appearance of corruption, stating that 
such concerns are at their “zenith”67 when organizations contribute 
directly to candidates or their campaigns because there is an “inherently 
stronger nexus to particular candidates”68 when express advocacy is 
involved.  The court also noted that Citizens United allowed 
corporations to have significantly more liberties in the field of campaign 
finance, which placed even more emphasis on the prevention of 
corruption in campaign finance cases.69 
As a result, unlike Emily’s List, the court held in Stop This Insanity 
that the existence of separate bank accounts was “simply insufficient to 
overcome the appearance that the entity is in cahoots with the candidates 
and parties that it coordinates with and supports.”70  The court cited the 
average American’s current disillusionment with the area of campaign 
finance, stating that any holding indicating that the mere presence of 
separate bank accounts precluded a hybrid organization from 
participating in improper behavior was “naïve and simply out of 
touch.”71  However, this decision did not limit what Stop This Insanity 
could do by creating a legally distinct Super PAC, stating explicitly that 
the organization could easily do so and receive contributions in 
“unlimited amounts.”72  The fact that this proposed hypothetical Super 
PAC would still be enmeshed financially and organizationally with Stop 
This Insanity was not discussed by the Court. 
In summary, no bright line rule emerges from the D.C. Circuit based 
on these two cases.  The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit 
subsequently affirmed Stop This Insanity, but made no mention of the 
application of contribution limits to functionally indistinguishable 
 
 64. Id. at 41. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id.  
 67. Id. at 43. 
 68. Id. at 41. 
 69. Id. at 42. 
 70. Id. at 43. 
 71. Id. at 44. 
 72. Id. 
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groups.73  It is clear that, even by the D.C. Circuit’s most restrictive 
standards, an organization need only create two legally distinct 
committees, one of which is a Super PAC, to ensure that their committee 
be allowed to accept unlimited contributions and make unlimited 
independent expenditures.  Under this standard, the committees set up 
by North Carolina Right to Life, Inc. would unquestionably be 
permitted. 
III. NOT INDEPENDENT ENOUGH: THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S DECISION IN 
VERMONT RIGHT TO LIFE COMMITTEE V. SORRELL 
The Vermont Right to Life Committee (VRLC) was formed in 1971 
to represent the interests of individuals opposed to abortion and 
euthanasia.74  In 1999, the VRLC formed the Vermont Right to Life-
Fund for Independent Political Expenditures (VRLC-FIPE) for the 
purpose of making unlimited political expenditures that were not 
coordinated with any specific candidates.75  Later, the VRLC formed 
another entity called the Vermont Right to Life, Inc. Political Committee 
(VRLC-PC) which was formed with the purpose of donating direct 
expenditures to candidates and their campaigns.76  The two committees 
function as a Super PAC and a PAC, respectively, of VRLC.  Though 
VRLC-FIPE and VRLC-PC are legally distinct, they share much of the 
same leadership.77  The suit was brought against the Vermont Attorney 
General to contest, amongst other things, the enforcement of 
contribution limits as applied to VRLC-FIPE.78  VRLC and VRLC-FIPE 
contended that, since VRLC-FIPE was a Super PAC, it was exempt 
from contribution limits.  The organizations also argued that the 
application of contribution limits infringed upon VRLC-FIPE’s freedom 
of speech.79 
The Second Circuit observed that, while VRLC-PC and VRLC-FIPE 
were legally distinct entities, they were significantly enmeshed with 
each other.80  To reach this conclusion, the court looked to the specific 
circumstances surrounding the two entities.  First, it analyzed the 
evidence that VRLC-FIPE presented to distinguish itself from VRCL-
 
 73. Stop This Insanity Inc. Employee Leadership Fund v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 761 F.3d 10 
(D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 74. About Us, VERMONT RIGHT TO LIVE COMM., http://www.vrlc.net/about/ (last visited, Sep. 
25, 2014). 
 75. Vermont Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Sorrell, 758 F.3d 118. 122 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 143–44.  
 78. Id. at 121. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 144. 
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PC: organizational documents distinguishing the two committees as 
separate creations of VRLC and the existence of separate bank 
accounts.81  The court held that these two facts, alone, were not enough 
to overcome substantial evidence that the two organizations were 
enmeshed. 
The court stated that, in order to find that two groups were enmeshed 
financially, a number of factors ought to be considered, including “the 
overlap of staff and resources, the lack of financial independence, the 
coordination of activities, and the flow of information between the 
entities.”82  The State submitted numerous depositions, financial reports, 
emails, meeting minutes, and expert reports to support the accusation 
that the two entities were significantly enmeshed.83  In these materials, 
the State established that there was a “fluidity of funds” between VRLC-
PC and VRLC-FIPE, meaning that funds would be transferred from 
VRLC-PC to VRLC-FIPE when necessary.84  Additionally, on at least 
one occasion in 2008, the two groups shared a joint fundraising 
venture.85 
As well as finding evidence that the organizations were enmeshed 
financially, the court also held that the evidence illustrated that VRLC-
PC and VRLC-FIPE were enmeshed organizationally.  While it would 
not be improper for the two groups to exist as sister subsidiaries of 
VRLC, an accountant for the state established that VRLC held 
“complete control” over the groups’ structures and finances.86  
Furthermore, the court found that the leadership of the two committees 
contained substantial overlap in terms of both personnel and 
communication.87  Additionally, there was evidence that the groups 
participated in specific activities, such as the production of voter guides, 
in total concert with each other.88  Finally, the court found it telling that 
VRLC-FIPE never made any effort to break the lines of communication 
“between the candidate, VRLC, and VRLC-PC.”89  Based on these facts, 
each of which went undisputed by the plaintiffs, the court determined 
that VRLC-FIPE and VRLC-PC were enmeshed financially and 
organizationally.90 
Accordingly, the Second Circuit reasoned that, because contribution 
 
 81. Id. at 143. 
 82. Id. at 142. 
 83. Id. at 143.  
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 143–44. 
 88. Id. at 144. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id.  
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limits were constitutionally applied to VRLC-PC, those same 
contribution limits must be applied to VRLC-FIPE.91  The court noted 
that the traditional reason that Super PACs were deemed unlikely to 
give rise to quid pro quo corruption was a lack of “prearrangement and 
coordination” with candidates or their campaigns.92  The court 
concluded that, in order to ensure that such prearrangement and 
coordination did not exist, there must be, at a minimum, some 
“organizational separation” between the PAC and the corresponding 
Super PAC.93  Based on the factors considered above, the court 
concluded that VRLC-FIPE was “functionally indistinguishable” from 
VRLC-PC and that this organizational separation was not present.94  As 
a result of this enmeshment, the court stated that concerns about favors 
exchanged quid pro quo for expenditures could apply to both groups 
equally.95  Therefore, the court concluded that any contribution limits to 
which VRLC-PC was subject also applied to VRLC-FIPE.96 
IV. THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S HOLDING IN VERMONT RIGHT TO LIFE 
COMMITTEE V. SORRELL IS NARROWLY TAILORED, AVOIDS 
INFRINGMENT ON FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS, AND IS EASILY 
APPLICABLE TO FUTURE CASES 
This Casenote advocates the adoption of the Second Circuit’s holding 
in Vermont Right to Life Committee v. Sorrell.  This recommendation is 
based mainly on four observations drawn from the case holding.  First, it 
is significant that the court narrowed its holding to address concerns of 
quid pro quo corruption.  Second, the court’s holding does not raise 
significant First Amendment concerns.  Third, the standard of functional 
indistinguishableness is well-defined and easily applied.  Finally, the 
court’s holding has strong common sense appeal which comes full circle 
to reducing the appearance of general political corruption. 
A. Narrow Focus on Preventing Quid Pro Quo Corruption 
Other circuits should adopt the position of the Second Circuit because 
it is properly focused on the goal of preventing the existence or 
appearance of quid pro quo corruption.  Since VRLC-FIPE makes only 
independent expenditures, it is the type of committee which courts have 
 
 91. Id. at 141. 
 92. Id. (citing Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 345, 357–61 (2010)). 
 93. Id. at 142.  
 94. Id. at 145. 
 95. Id.  
 96. Id. 
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traditionally held unlikely to create the appearance of corruption.97  
However, the Second Circuit was very careful to emphasize the special 
circumstances of this case which made it more likely than usual that 
corruption could either exist or be perceived to exist.  Emphasizing the 
specific facts of the case at hand, the Second Circuit demonstrated that 
VRLC-FIPE should not be afforded the same benefit of the doubt 
normally afforded to Super PACs. 
The Court makes clear that VRLC-FIPE only cultivates the air of 
corruption through its connections to VRLC and VRLC-PC.  The 
“fluidity of funds” between the three groups suggested circumvention of 
the regulations governing the different organizations in their individual 
capacities.98  Examination of the groups’ meeting minutes revealed that 
they did not regard their streams of funding as separate, resulting in at 
least one incident where VLRC-FIPE and VRLC-PC held a joint 
fundraising event.99  These connections support the holding that the 
organizations were enmeshed financially.   
Furthermore, the groups were enmeshed organizationally.  The court 
noted that VRLC held complete control over leadership positions of 
both groups.100  Members of either committee were chosen by the 
president of VRLC and approved by VRLC’s board.  VRLC-PC and 
VRLC-FIPE met at the same place at the same time and were known to 
discuss campaign issues together.101  The groups contained substantial 
overlap in membership, with at least two examples of members 
attending both meetings.102  Perhaps most tellingly was the nexus of 
communication that existed throughout the groups.  VRLC and VRLC-
PC were each known to coordinate with candidates, as was their right.  
However, there is no point at which VRLC-FIPE separated itself from 
these lines of communication, calling into serious question whether 
VRLC-FIPE was actually able to function without having coordinated 
with candidates.103  This set of facts led the Court to make a 
determination that the various groups were enmeshed organizationally.   
Based on these two sets of facts, the Court determined that VRLC-
FIPE’s connections with VRLC and VRLC-PC distinguished VRLC-
FIPE from typical groups which make only independent expenditures.  
In fact, VRLC-FIPE’s financial organizational enmeshment with the 
other groups created a situation where the three groups were 
 
 97. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 357. 
 98. Sorrell, 758 F.3d at 143.  
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 144. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
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“functionally indistinguishable.”104  In such a case, the likelihood of 
corruption or the appearance of corruption is significantly greater than in 
a scenario where Super PAC exists outside of such a connection.  The 
court reasoned that Super PACs were typically held to be less likely to 
give rise to corruption because of their mandated lack of communication 
with candidates.105  When groups are so significantly connected, the 
assurance of a lack of communication vanishes and concerns of 
corruption reemerge.  Were VRLC-FIPE to disconnect from the other 
two groups, it would no longer be an organization that made likely the 
existence or the perceived existence of corruption.   
This analysis is one of the key strengths of the Second Circuit’s 
holding.  If the court had based its holding on another motivation for 
enforcing contribution limits on a Super PAC, the limits would not have 
been, nor should they have been, enforceable.  For example, if the court 
had held that they were enforcing contribution limits as a way of 
punishing VRLC for attempting to circumvent legal restrictions or as a 
way of reducing the amount of money in politics, those motivations 
would be arguably unconstitutional, resulting in an unenforceable 
holding.106  Instead, the court properly aligned its holding with the only 
constitutionally valid motivation for enforcing contribution limits upon 
Super PACs, thus providing a compelling reason for other circuits to 
follow in its footsteps. 
B. First Amendment Concerns 
While the interest in preventing corruption is heightened in cases 
involving indistinguishable groups, the corresponding limitation on First 
Amendment rights is comparatively low.  First Amendment rights in the 
field of campaign finance concern the abilities of committees to express 
themselves politically.107  Normally, courts enforce contribution 
limitations on organizations like VRLC-FIPE in the interest of 
preventing possible corruption.  These limitations, however, prevent 
parties from expressing as much financial support for an issue or 
candidate as they are constitutionally permitted to express.  
Accordingly, courts are generally reluctant to limit a Super PAC’s 
ability to express financial support through the use of contribution 
limits.108  
However, in the case at hand, the only concerns that exist regarding 
 
 104. Id. at 145. 
 105. Id. 
 106. McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1441 (2014). 
 107. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976). 
 108. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 357 (2010). 
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corruption are directly tied to VRLC-FIPE’s attachments to VRLC and 
VRLC-PC.  If VRLC-FIPE were to remove itself from the financial and 
organizational enmeshments that entangled it with the other two groups, 
its ability to receive unlimited contributions would remain uninhibited 
by the court.  Although requiring this sort of separation does impose 
some hardship on committees that operate with “low funding levels, 
small staff, and few resources,”109 the court held that preventing 
potential quid pro quo corruption outweighed these hardships.110 
C. The Functionally Indistinguishable Standard 
In order for other courts to follow the holding of the Second Circuit, 
there must be a clear standard for them to apply.  In short, The Second 
Circuit held that a Super PAC that is “functionally indistinguishable” 
from a group subject to contribution limits may itself have to abide by 
those contribution limits.111  This holding, however, did not instruct 
other circuits on the means of determining whether a committee is 
“functionally indistinguishable” from another entity.  If other circuits are 
to be expected conform to this holding, then the term “functionally 
indistinguishable” ought to be clearly defined.   
As discussed previously, there are two types of enmeshment that the 
Second Circuit discussed in finding that VRLC-FIPE is functionally 
indistinguishable from VRLC-PC: financial enmeshment and 
organizational enmeshment.112  When the Court discussed VRLC-
FIPE’s financial enmeshment, it considered factors such as the fluidity 
of funds between the groups and the committees’ joint fundraising 
goals.113  Therefore, it is clear from the court’s discussion what 
constitutes financial enmeshment.  When the court discusses 
organizational enmeshment, it considered factors such as the overlap in 
staff and oversight, as well as the unbroken lines of communication.114  
Therefore, the court clearly laid out what facts lead to a finding of 
organizational enmeshment.  Because both terms are arguably defined 
within the Second Circuit’s opinion, it seems as though “functionally 
indistinguishable” is merely the sum of these two types of enmeshment.  
However, the arithmetic may not be quite that simple. 
At no point in the court’s opinion did it make any explicit statement 
that functional indistinguishableness is the sum of financial and 
 
 109. Vermont Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Sorrell, 758 F.3d 118. 145 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 141.  
 113. Id. at 143. 
 114. Id. at 143–44. 
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organizational enmeshment.  From its previous discussions, this 
equation may feel implied and even intuitive, but the court’s failure to 
expressly define the elements of the equation may be the largest and 
most important ambiguity in its holding.  For example, the court never 
says whether both types of enmeshment are essential for a group to be 
functionally indistinguishable.  It seems logical that two groups could be 
functionally indistinguishable if the boards were entirely different, yet 
there existed a fluidity of funds and joint fundraising goals.  Likewise, 
two groups that kept entirely separate funds but were composed of the 
same board members and had unbroken lines of communication could 
just as easily be believed to be functionally indistinguishable. 
 To further complicate matters, all of the elements of this hypothetical 
exercise seem to exist on the extreme edge of impermissibility.  The 
court makes no mention of how much connection constitutes 
enmeshment.  In other words, though the equation appears to be fairly 
simple, better definitions of its elements would be preferable, especially 
if the holding is to be adopted by other circuits.  Nevertheless, the 
individual factors of the equation are sufficiently well-defined enough to 
allow other circuits to replicate the Second Circuit’s holding. 
D. Common Sense Element 
The Second Circuit’s common sense approach to campaign finance is 
a deceptively simple argument in favor of the holding.  In an area of the 
law where one of the only constitutional rationales for enforcing a law is 
to prevent the appearance of corruption, a holding’s common sense 
appeal is actually a fairly compelling argument in its favor.  
Furthermore, in an era where courts have explicitly cited Americans’ 
disillusionment with campaign finance, it is essential that holdings 
which rule on the appearance of corruption make intuitive sense to the 
average observer.115  A holding which allowed a committee to reap the 
benefits of being a Super PAC while simultaneously retaining all the 
benefits of a PAC would strike observing citizens as just another 
instance of the game being rigged.  Forcing legislatures to close this 
potential loophole is something that would appeal to this sort of 
observant citizen and is an action that represents a significant step 
toward reducing the appearance of corruption in the field of campaign 
finance. 
 
 115. Stop This Insanity, Inc. Employee Leadership Fund v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 902 F. Supp. 
2d 23, 26 (D.D.C. 2012), aff’d, 761 F.3d 10 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
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V. COUNTER-ARGUMENTS TO THE POSITION TAKEN BY THE SECOND 
CIRCUIT 
There are several logical counter-arguments that oppose the Second 
Circuit’s holding.  While these counter-arguments are important and 
must be addressed, this Casenote asserts that the Second Circuit’s 
holding in Vermont Right to Life Committee v. Sorrell provides the best 
solution to the issue of whether courts can limit contributions made to 
Super PACs that are deemed functionally indistinguishable from other 
PACs.  The first of these counter-arguments is that the Second Circuit 
interferes with VRLC-FIPE’s ability to exercise its Freedom of 
Expression.  The second counter-argument is that the Second Circuit did 
not create a circuit split, but instead merely agreed with the holding of 
the Fourth Circuit in Leake.  The final counter-argument is that the 
Second Circuit’s holding will reduce neither the existence of nor the 
appearance of corruption.   
A. The Second Circuit’s Holding Infringes of VRLC-FIPE’s Ability 
to Exercise its Freedom of Expression 
One argument against the Second Circuit’s holding is that it infringes 
on the freedom of speech of independent expenditures-only committees.  
As the Supreme Court stated in McCutcheon v. Federal Election 
Commission, a party’s right to participate in elections is protected by the 
First Amendment.116  However, this right may be abridged when it 
becomes necessary to avoid the appearance of quid pro quo 
corruption.117  In Citizens United, the Supreme Court expressed concern 
that placing expenditure limits upon groups that made independent 
expenditures would have a chilling effect on the groups’ exercise of 
freedom of speech.118  The Court determined that such concerns 
outweighed any concern regarding the appearance of quid pro quo 
corruption.119  Likewise, the court in Emily’s List expressed concern 
over the application of contribution limits to hybrid groups, holding that 
a group that made independent expenditures “does not suddenly forfeit 
its First Amendment rights when it decides also to make direct 
contributions to parties or candidates.”120 
These opinions demonstrate that placing contribution limits on Super 
PACs raises significant First Amendment concerns.  One could argue 
 
 116. McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1441 (2014). 
 117. Id. 
 118. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 357 (2010). 
 119. Id. 
 120. Emily's List v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 581 F.3d 1, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
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that these concerns may continue to outweigh concerns over the 
appearance of quid pro quo corruption, even after a group has been 
deemed functionally indistinguishable from a group on which 
contribution limitations apply.  However, when groups are so closely 
enmeshed as to be functionally indistinguishable, it ought to raise an 
especially high level of concern about the appearance of quid pro quo 
corruption.   
Super PACs that are functionally indistinguishable from regular 
PACs have a line of communication to the candidate which is highly 
suggestive of coordination.  In Sorrell, the Court observed that there was 
no point where VRLC-FIPE distanced itself from the lines of 
communication between the VRLC and VRLC-PC, and the candidates 
with which those committees coordinated their expenditures.121  This 
nexus of communication makes it increasingly improbable in the eyes of 
the general public that VRLC-FIPE was not coordinating with political 
candidates.  As stated by Judge Michael’s dissent in Leake, holding that 
a group may be exempt from contribution limits and simultaneously 
enmeshed with a group allowed to make direct contributions to political 
campaigns is a “complete rejection” of the government’s interest in 
“limiting the influence of money in politics to prevent the appearance 
and reality of corruption.”122  Therefore, because the appearance of quid 
pro quo corruption is abnormally high in situations of functionally 
indistinguishable committees, the possibility that limiting contributions 
to independent expenditure-only committees might produce a chilling 
effect of the exercise of freedom of speech should not outweigh the 
importance of limiting the appearance of quid pro quo corruption. 
B. No Circuit Split was Created by the Second Circuit’s Holding 
Another argument against the Sorrell holding is that no circuit split 
was created by the Second Circuit, but rather the Second Circuit is 
following wording found in the dicta of the Fourth Circuit’s opinion in 
Leake.  In Leake, the state argued that NCRL-FIPE was “closely 
entwined” with the NCRL and the NCRL-PAC.123  The Fourth Circuit 
declined to address this argument, stating that the state was asking the 
court to pierce the organization’s corporate veil.  The court did state, 
however, that it may have elected to conduct such an inquiry had the 
state been able to introduce into its arguments “any evidence that the 
plaintiffs are abusing their legal forms or ‘any legal authority that 
 
 121. Vermont Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Sorrell, 758 F.3d 118. 144 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 122. N. Carolina Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake, 525 F.3d 274, 337 (4th Cir. 2008) (dissenting 
opinion). 
 123. Id. at 294, n.8. 
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considers [political committees] and their sponsoring corporation as 
identical entities.’”124 
It can be argued that this language from the Fourth Circuit does not 
run contrary to the holdings of the Second Circuit but, rather, serves as 
an introduction to the Second Circuit’s analysis of an organization that 
abused its legal form.  A close reading of the Second Circuit’s 
breakdown of VRLC-FIPE’s interactions with VRLC-PC reveals several 
instances that could be interpreted as the two organizations abusing their 
legal forms.  Of particular interest is the stated “fluidity of funds” that 
existed between the groups’ bank accounts.125  The argument might 
therefore be made that, had the Fourth Circuit been presented with the 
facts from Sorrell, they may have reached the same outcome as the 
Second Circuit. 
Even so, it would be a mistake to interpret the courts’ holdings as 
being congruent.  The crux of the Second Circuit’s holding is not that 
VRLC-FIPE abused its legal status, but that it had become so enmeshed 
with VRLC-PC and VRLC that it could no longer be trusted to enjoy its 
status as an independent expenditure-only committee for fear of the 
appearance of quid pro quo corruption.126  A legitimate question exists 
as to whether the Second Circuit’s idea of enmeshment can occur 
without abuse of a legal form.  The Second Circuit mentioned two types 
of enmeshment: financial enmeshment and organizational 
enmeshment.127  In his dissenting opinion in Leake, Judge Michael 
observed that NCRL-FIPE shared many important resources with NCRL 
and NCRL-PAC, some of which were facilities, directors, and staff .128  
These sorts of non-financial resources are the types of resources that the 
Second Circuit referred to when it discussed organizational 
enmeshment.   
Because it would seem that organizational enmeshment was present 
in Leake and the arrangement in Leake was not held to be improper, it 
should follow that organizational enmeshment does not equal abuse of 
legal forms.  Therefore, it would seem that the Fourth Circuit considered 
abuse of legal forms as something more akin to financial enmeshment.  
Though it is unclear whether the Second Circuit‘s holding would have 
been different had the two organizations were found to be only 
organizationally enmeshed, there is nothing in the opinion to suggest 
that financial enmeshment is a necessary element of finding that the 
 
 124. Id. (citing North Carolina Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake, 482 F.Supp.2d 686, 699 
(E.D.N.C.2007)). 
 125. Sorrell, 758 F.3d at 143.  
 126. Id. at 145. 
 127. Id. at 141.  
 128. Leake, 525 F.3d at 336 (dissenting opinion). 
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organizations were “functionally indistinguishable.”129  By contrast, the 
court seems view “fluidity of funds” as a contributing factor rather than 
a necessary factor.130  Therefore, a circuit split was created regarding 
whether contribution limits could be enforced against a Super PAC 
which was functionally indistinguishable from a corresponding PAC, 
because the standards of enmeshment and abuse of legal forms are 
distinct. 
C. The Second Circuit’s Holding will not Prevent the Existence or 
Appearance of Corruption 
It could also be argued that the removal of financial and 
organizational enmeshment will not prevent the potential for corruption 
which occurs when a PAC and a Super PAC exist under a common 
parent organization, as was the case in Sorrell.  Indeed, one could 
reasonably believe that future organizations aware of the Second 
Circuit’s holding would merely take the necessary steps toward ensuring 
that their organizations are not functionally indistinguishable and then 
continue to use the others’ legal status for mutual benefit. 
Such a viewpoint raises many issues.  First and foremost, it is difficult 
to imagine a position which more strictly enforces contribution limits, 
yet does not run contrary to the Supreme Court’s campaign finance 
jurisprudence or raise fundamental First Amendment concerns.  In the 
case of VRLC, once VRLC-FIPE and VRLC-PC were no longer 
enmeshed financially or organizationally, they had no tangible 
connection other than their connection under VRLC.  To that extent, 
their connection is simply that they are organizations sharing a core 
belief and working toward a common goal.  One of the major strengths 
of the Second Circuit’s holding is that it creates a clear judicial 
preference for separation within the corporate structures of the two 
groups without creating any serious impediments of their rights to 
pursue their common goals.  Absent future Supreme Court decisions on 
the subject, it is doubtful that the Second Circuit could or should have 
gone any further in limiting contribution limits to Super PACs. 
Though Super PACs are often painted in a corrupt light, they are 
constitutional institutions so long as they do not coordinate with 
candidates that they support.131  As a result, the Second Circuit was not, 
and could not, attempt to outlaw independent expenditure-only 
committees or chip away at their ability to perform their duties.  The 
court’s holding is narrow in the sense that it only attempts to close a 
 
 129. Sorrell, 758 F.3d at 145. 
 130. Id. at 143. 
 131. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 47 (1976). 
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loophole that raised the “danger that expenditures will be spent as quid 
pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate.”132  No court 
would raise the argument that all Super PACs are or appear to be thinly 
veiled attempts to bypass judicial limitations on committee spending.  
Unless courts were to hold that another motivation existed for limiting 
contributions to Super PACs besides limiting the reality or appearance 
of corruption, future courts should not place any more limits upon Super 
PAC contributions than those imposed by the Second Circuit. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The fact that courts cite the disillusionment of average citizens with 
the campaign finance process suggests that courts are losing the battle to 
reduce the appearance of quid pro quo corruption.  It is distasteful to 
think that power and influence can be purchased but it is also clear that, 
in an era where $3.7 billion is spent in a year without a presidential 
election, there are campaign contributors who believe that they are 
buying something.133  Although this high level of spending may create 
the impression that elections are bought and paid for, the normal process 
of purchasing political advertisements through a Super PAC is not 
illegal.  Short of serious reform of current Supreme Court jurisprudence 
on the subject, courts should at least be vigilant to ensure that there is 
compliance with the already established limitations.  To forward this 
goal, courts can focus on preventing parties from circumventing 
contribution limitations to PACs by making contributions to functionally 
indistinguishable Super PACs. 
The Second Circuit’s holding in Vermont Right to Life Committee v. 
Sorrell represents a step forward in the field of campaign finance.  It 
prevents the appearance of corruption while imposing a minimal 
restriction of committees’ First Amendment rights of political 
expression.  Furthermore, it contains a good deal of common sense.  The 
only caveat to the holding’s overall success is that it fails to set down a 
fully articulated test regarding what constitutes functional 
indistinguishableness.  Even so, the court does provide examples of 
what sorts of enmeshment constitute functional indistinguishableness as 
well as examples of what sorts of activities constitute each type of 
enmeshment.  Therefore, short of a definitive test, the Second Circuit at 
least set down repeatable guidelines for future courts to follow and 
reproduce.  For these reasons, the Second Circuit’s holding regarding 
 
 132. Sorrell, 758 F.3d at 145. 
 133. Peter Overby, What Can $3.7 Billion Buy? How About 2,969,370 Campaign Ads, NAT’L 
PUB. RADIO (Oct. 29, 2014), http://www.npr.org/blogs/itsallpolitics/2014/10/29/359895496/what-can-3-
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contribution limits to Super PACs that are functionally indistinguishable 
from traditional PACs is the correct holding and should be adopted by 
other circuits.  
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